Competition, regulation and broadband access to the internet by Götz, Georg
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Götz, Georg
Conference Paper
Competition, regulation and broadband
access to the internet
22nd European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society
(ITS2011), Budapest, 18 - 21 September, 2011: Innovative ICT Applications - Emerging
Regulatory, Economic and Policy Issues
Provided in cooperation with:
International Telecommunications Society (ITS)
Suggested citation: Götz, Georg (2011) : Competition, regulation and broadband access to
the internet, 22nd European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications
Society (ITS2011), Budapest, 18 - 21 September, 2011: Innovative ICT Applications - Emerging
Regulatory, Economic and Policy Issues, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/5216622
nd European Regional ITS Conference  






Georg Götz  
 






This paper re-examines the effect of the regulatory regime on both penetration and coverage 
of broadband access to the internet. The framework also allows for an evaluation of different 
public policy measures such as subsidization of broadband demand and supply. A welfare 
analysis asks what the optimal regulatory regime is and whether and how high-speed access to 
the internet should be subsidized. Using an approach similar to Valletti et al. (2002), the paper 
highlights the importance of population density for whether firms invest to provide internet 
access. The analysis reveals a trade-off between coverage and penetration. 
 
JEL codes  L51 and L96 
 
 
Keywords  broadband internet, penetration, coverage, subsidies 
 
 
Justus-Liebig-University Giessen,   
Chair for Industrial Organization, Reguluation and Antitrust – VWL I,  
Licher Str. 62, 35394 Giessen, Germany. Phone/Fax +49 641 99 -22050/-19867, 
Email: Georg.Goetz@wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de, http://wiwi.uni-giessen.de/home/goetz/  2 
 
                                                
1.  Introduction 
High-speed access to the internet ranks highly on the political agenda. Penetration and 
coverage of so-called broadband access to the internet are top political priorities both in the 
EU and the US. Bridging the ‘digital divide’ by providing broadband to rural areas is a major 
goal of EU-policy.
1 How to reach both high coverage and high penetration is a much disputed 
issue.
2 The appropriate amount of regulatory intervention into Very High-Speed DSL 
networks (VDSL) was the matter of an argument between the European Commission’s DG 
InfSoc and the German regulator. While the Commission took a more interventionist position, 
the German regulator and the German federal government argued in favor of a regulatory 
holiday for investments in VDSL infrastructure. Anecdotal empirical evidence shows that 
more regulation need not yield better performance in terms of broadband access. In 2005 
coverage and penetration was 98% and 45%, respectively, in Switzerland, where neither ex-
ante regulation of wholesale tariffs nor unbundling of the local loop existed. In much more 
interventionist Germany, the respective numbers were below 90% and 20%, respectively.
3 
This paper reexamines the effect of the regulatory regime on both penetration and coverage. 
The framework also allows for an evaluation of different public policy measures such as 
subsidization of broadband demand and supply. A welfare analysis asks what the optimal 
regulatory regime is and whether and how high-speed access to the internet should be 
subsidized. Introducing population density in a model of broadband access along the lines of 
Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000), Foros and Kind (2003), and, in particular, Valletti et al. 
(2002), the paper highlights the importance of population density for investment into internet 
access. Due to fixed investment requirements to serve a local market, costs per potential user 
depend largely on population density in local markets.
4 Therefore, the spatial distribution of 
 
1 See, for instance, the EU commission’s initiative “Bridging the Broadband Gap” at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/events/broadband_gap_2007/index_en.htm. 
2 See the Economist magazine, January 29, 2009 for a discussion of different 
initiatives.  
3 For an overview of worldwide government activities regarding broadband access see 
Picot and Wernick, 2007. Recent data on coverage and penetration as well as policy 
statements with respect to the EU are available in European Commission (2008).  
4 Due to technical restrictions of the DSL-technology (which change rapidly over 
time!) the maximum distance between a user and the switch needs to be below about 5.5 km. 
Otherwise, potential bandwidth is below what is typically considered broadband access. This 
leads to well-defined local markets around the main switches  3 
 
population largely determines geographical coverage. For given technological and economic 
conditions, a population density threshold exists below which investment will not break even.  
The analysis reveals a trade-off between coverage and penetration; high – regulated – 
wholesale and retail prices, respectively, lead to wide coverage but low penetration. Higher 
prices create incentives for investment since they lead to higher profits for given market size. 
Low prices yield high demand in served areas and an increase in penetration even though 
coverage decreases. However, this holds only as long as the regulator prescribes tariffs which 
are above a certain threshold value. If the regulator sets prices too low, the negative effect on 
incentives to invest more than compensates for the demand increasing effect in served areas.  
There is now considerable empirical literature on the effects of both intra-platform and inter-
platform competition on broadband uptake (see, e.g., Aron and Burnstein (2003), Denni and 
Gruber (2005), Distaso et al. (2006), Höffler (2007), Wallsten (2006)); see Lee and Brown 
(2008) for an overview). Taken together, these studies confirm – with varying levels of 
significance –  that both inter-platform competition and more favorable terms for intra-platform 
competition have a positive effect on broadband adoption. In the case of intra-platform 
competition this holds typical for both the prices for local loop unbundling and for the terms on 
which rival firms obtain access to the telecom incumbent’s network. It is reassuring that these 
studies confirm what one would expect at least within a static framework: More (network) 
competition and more product differentiation lead to higher demand and output. The same holds if 
regulators prescribe lower prices and more favorable access conditions. After all, this confirms 
that demand for broadband access is downward sloping.   
The results of my paper put the above studies into perspective and indicate directions of future 
empirical analysis. They show that lower prices to increase broadband uptake typically come 
at a cost in terms of investment and coverage. Furthermore, simple requests for “more 
competition”, whatever that means, also face a cost when investments in new networks and 
technologies are determined by Schumpeterian trade-offs. One instance of the problems 
regulation in a new market faces, arises when regulators try to set tariffs cost-oriented. As I 
show, geographically averaged tariffs lead to a breakdown of the market if they are cost-
based. Firms would not have an incentive to invest at all. Simulations, which reproduce key 
features of the German market, show that the optimum mark-up on average costs is between 
70 and 100 percent as long as the population is not served fully.  
Formally, the paper compares a scenario where a (fixed line telecom) incumbent faces 
service-based competition with a scenario with facilities-based competition. In the latter case, 4 
 
                                                
up to two infrastructure-based operators offer broadband access in the different regions. In the 
model there will be an important difference between service-based and facilities-based 
competition from the viewpoint of consumers. Whereas consumers consider the products 
offered by different vendors of the DSL product of the incumbent as perfect substitutes, this 
does not hold for the relation between broadband access via DSL and via cable. Consumers 
regard these two platforms as differentiated products (see Distaso et al. (2006) for the same 
assumption). 
Germany provides an interesting example of missed opportunities regarding inter-platform 
competition. Due to fragmentation and to the fact that Deutsche Telekom until recently owned 
a major part of the cable network, inter-platform competition was almost absent until 
recently.
5 Simulations show that an earlier separation of the fixed-line and the cable network 
could have produced a higher welfare level than a sophisticated regulatory strategy based on 
intra-platform competition and unbundling. Inter-platform competition and the associated 
competition in infrastructure could have led to higher welfare, higher coverage and more 
product variety without further regulatory intervention.  
In a situation of largely unregulated inter-platform competition, geographical uniform pricing 
(UP) is a potential constraint on incumbent prices. The paper shows that regulators might 
introduce UP as a safeguard against preemption by an incumbent if consumers consider the 
different services as close substitutes. If products are more differentiated, uniform pricing and 
an unregulated benchmark yield about the same welfare level.  
A regime with uniform pricing is also interesting from a technical point of view. In the case of 
close substitutes pure-strategy equilibrium in prices no longer exists for given coverage areas. 
The resulting equilibria in mixed-strategies exhibit two interesting and intuitive features. First, 
only the incumbent randomizes, not the entrant. In the interpretation of Varian (1980), the 
strategy of charging a high price with a certain probability  and a low price with probability 
1-  implies that the incumbent makes special offers once in a while for a certain time span. 
Given that competition is very tough, in the remaining time the monopolist serves only 
consumers in monopoly regions. The second interesting feature concerns the effect of a 
change in the degree of product differentiation on equilibrium prices. In the region where 
pure-strategy equilibria exist, the ‘standard’ relation applies: As products become closer 
substitutes, competition intensifies and prices decrease. However, in the region of mixed-
 
5 See, for instance, Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wall Street Journal August 30, 2006 for 
an account of “Germany’s Cable Problem”. 5 
 
                                                
strategy equilibria, the opposite holds: A further decrease in the degree of product 
differentiation leads to higher (expected) prices. More intense competition leads the 
incumbent to extend the time periods in which she serves only consumers in the monopoly 
region. The probability that she charges a high price increases. 
The article also contributes to the discussion of various public policy instruments to promote 
broadband penetration.
6 I examine the positive and normative effects of subsidization of 
broadband demand and of investments in broadband infrastructure. The important result is 
that both demand and supply-side subsidies might increase welfare. Their relative 
effectiveness depends on the specific parameters of the model as well as on the details of the 
implementation. Simulations show that subsidization leading to 100% broadband coverage 
might lead to welfare levels which are at least as high as the situation without public policy 
intervention. This holds without accounting for potential network externalities. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model for a 
single (DSL) infrastructure. Within this framework, Section 3 compares regulated monopoly 
with the unregulated benchmark in terms of performance with respect to both penetration and 
coverage. As there are only few unambiguous effects, the paper presents a simulation tailored 
to the German situation to gain further insights into the order of magnitudes. Section 3 also 
deals with the setting of regulated tariffs and their dependence on the unevenness of the 
distribution of the population. Section 4 introduces facilities-based competition. It examines 
how unregulated platform competition performs compared to a situation with light-handed 
regulation by a uniform pricing constraint. Building on the simulation introduced in Section 3, 
it evaluates the welfare effects of the different scenarios of both regulated and unregulated, 
intra-platform and inter-platform competition. Section 5 addresses public policy in the form of 
both demand-side and supply-side subsidies. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  The basic model: A single infrastructure 
The potential market for broadband access consists of many regional markets with different 
population densities. In more formal terms, this means that there is a continuum of 
“cities/regions” which differ by their respective population density s. For simplicity, I assume 
a linear relation between the “number” of cities and their population density once we rank the 
 
6 See Goolsbee (2003) for an estimation of effects for U.S. states. See Gans (2007) for 
a policy discussion on the Australian situation. regions according to their population density s. Population density varies between 0 and the 
highest population density,s.  
 
Figure 1 
Consumer demand y(s) for broadband access in regional market s consists of the unit-demand 
of the households which differ with respect to their willingness to pay. I assume that the 
consumers’ willingness to pay is uniformly distributed on [0, a] with a density equal to s. 
With these simplifying assumptions, one obtains the linear demand function y depending on 
population density s: 
  y(s) = s (a – p) (1) 
The total number of households in regional market s is therefore as; an increase in population 
density affects demand proportionally.  
As far as technology is concerned I assume that broadband access requires fixed 
investments in the local exchanges, which serve the different regions. I assume that each 
region s is served by one exchange, and that upgrading to allow for either DSL or cable 
broadband access requires a fixed investment f, which is independent of population size in 
that region. The marginal costs of connecting costumers are constant and equal to c. 
Therefore, and contrary to in Foros and Kind (2003), these costs do not depend on the size of 
a regional market. In the next section I will examine the investment and pricing decisions of a 
monopoly incumbent both in the unregulated benchmark and under regulation.  
3.  Regulated monopoly 
In this section I consider a single infrastructure, which is operated by a telecom incumbent. 
The incumbent determines the coverage of her network by investing in the local exchanges, 




regulator determines the price at which the incumbent must sell his product. The buyers might 
either be interpreted as resellers or as final consumers. In the later case we have price-cap 
regulation, with the regulator fixing retail prices. In the former case, the regulator determines 
wholesale prices and requires the incumbent to provide wholesale access on these terms. The 
resulting service based competition leads to the same result as a price cap, if one assumes 
Bertrand competition among homogeneous entrants with zero marginal costs on the retail 
stage. I will make this assumption and the assumption that incumbent and competitors are 
equally efficient and their products are perfect substitutes. Further on, I will call the 
regulatory regime in this section service-based competition, my preferred interpretation.  
3.1  Benchmark: Coverage and penetration in unregulated monopoly 
As a benchmark and in order to demonstrate how the model works, I first present the decision 
problem of an unregulated monopolist. The monopolist faces a two-stage problem. First, she 
needs to decide on which markets to cover, i.e. where to invest. Second, she must determine 
on the price for the service in the regions where she offers it. The calculations are 
straightforward and start with the solution of the second stage. In this simple model, the 
monopolist charges identical prices in all markets. Consumer types are identical in all regions, 
only their number differs. As a consequence, differences in regions are solely due to different 
population densities and not to other features such as differences in the willingness to pay. 
This assumption is particularly important for the analysis of the effects of facilities-based 
competition performed below. It allows a focus on the effects of market size and competition. 
The monopoly price p
M in covered markets reads:  
p
M = (a + c)/2 
The resulting profit in a market of population density s is  

M(s) = s(a – c)
2 
/ 4. 
Given the reduced profit, the first-stage investment decision is straightforward. The 
monopolist upgrades the networks in a local markets, in which the profit is greater than the 
fixed investment cost, i.e. in all markets s where  

M(s)  f. 
Solving this condition for the boundary value gives the population density s of the smallest 
market covered by the monopolist:  
s
M
 = 4 f / (a – c)
2
 Coverage together with the monopoly price allows calculation of broadband penetration Y 















  . 
In the next subsection, I derive the respective values of coverage and penetration as a function 
of the price set by the regulator.  
3.2  Regulated monopoly: price cap and service-based competition, resp. 
In this regime the regulator sets the retail and the wholesale price p, respectively. This 
determines the profit 
R(s) the incumbent earns in a market of size s: 

R(s) = s(a – p) (p – c).  
The incumbent’s decision rule is analogous to that in the previous case: Invest if the profits in 
a region are greater than the investment costs. In formal terms: 

R(s)  f. 
Solving this condition for the population density s
R of the smallest market covered by the 
incumbent under regulation yields:  
s
R = f /((a – p) (p – c))  s
M. 
Penetration Y












At this stage, I want to highlight what the model tells about coverage and penetration. As 
already shown in Valletti et al., coverage is higher under unregulated monopoly than under 
price regulation. This is a rather general, Schumpeterian result, which does not depend on the 
specific demand specification:  
Monopoly yields the highest profits in local markets. Therefore the incentive to invest is at a 
maximum. Regulation reduces investment by reducing profits and leads to lower coverage. 
Furthermore, this result implies that all marketing instruments, which increase profits such as 
price discrimination increase investment and therefore coverage.  
Regulators, who act primarily through (low) retail or wholesale prices, necessarily run into 
problems with respect to coverage. In Section 5 below I will discuss what the importance of 
other policy instruments and initiatives such as subsidies or coverage constraints could be 
with respect to coverage and penetration.  
8 
 The effect of price regulation on penetration is ambiguous. The following example examines 
the relation in more detail. The parameters are chosen to reproduce the order of magnitude of 
the German broadband market.  
3.3  Regulated vs. unregulated monopoly: An example 
The example calculates coverage and penetration as a function of the price set by the 
regulator. With respect to the parameters of the model I assume: a = 100, c = 0, s = 1000, and 
f = 500 000. These parameters give a potential market of 50,000,000 households and users, 
respectively. The (monthly) maximum willingness to pay for broadband access is € 100, 
monthly capital costs are € 500,000. The population at one of the 1000 local exchanges is 
between 0 and 100000 households. Note that I chose 1000 rather than the actual number of 
about 8000 German local exchanges to obtain nicer values. 
The calculation of the unregulated monopoly is straightforward. For the monopolist’s price 
p
M, his smallest covered region s
M, and for monopoly penetration Y
M, we obtain 
p
M = 50, s
M = 200, Y
M = 24,000,000.  
In percentage terms this implies that 96% of all households are covered, the penetration ratio 
is 48%. 
Figures 2 and 3 show coverage and penetration as a function of the price set by the regulator, 



























Figure 3: Coverage (smallest served region) as a function of price set by the regulator 
The figures highlight the non-monotonous relation between the regulated price and 
penetration: Penetration initially increases with decreasing prices. However, as the price cap 
becomes very low, penetration eventually decreases. The reason for this pattern is twofold: 
First, the price decrease increases demand in covered regions. Second, lower prices lead to 
lower investments by the incumbent, as a result coverage and the number of potential 
consumers decreases. Note that both the non-monotonicity result and the investment result do 
not depend on the specific example. They only require that lower prices (below the monopoly 
price) lead to lower profits and that profits are lower in smaller markets.  
The above results highlight a rather fundamental trade-off from the viewpoint of the regulator: 
If only the price is available as an instrument, higher penetration comes inevitably at the 
expense of low(er) coverage (as long as one is to the right of the maximum in Figure 2). 
Germany appears to be a particularly good example for this tradeoff: The number of 
broadband retail lines increased from about 10 to about 20 million lines from the end of 2005 
to the end of 2007, an increase in penetration from below 10 broadband lines per 100 
population to almost 24 lines. At the same time coverage in rural regions stagnated at below 
60% of all households in rural regions, so that the report “Broadband coverage in Europe” 
finds that “the gap between coverage in rural areas and national average is particularly 
significant in Slovakia, Italy, Latvia and Germany”.
7 Due to different conditions regarding 
topography and population densities, simple comparisons of rates e.g. for the unbundled local 
loop across countries do not appear to be very meaningful. What is interesting is that rural 
coverage increased in Austria from a value of close to 60% to almost 80%, whereas 
                                                 
7 See European Commission (2007), p. 7. 11 
 
penetration rose only from slightly above 10 broadband lines per 100 population to 19 lines.
8 
In Austria broadband wholesale access is regulated on a retail-minus basis whereas regulation 
in Germany is cost-oriented.  
Given the trade-off between coverage and penetration, it is interesting to look at the 
regulator’s choice of prices under different objective functions. Here I distinguish two 
possible objectives: maximization of total welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and profits 
and maximization of penetration. As noted above the unregulated monopoly yields maximum 
coverage and might therefore serve as a benchmark. Here I want to compare only the different 
outcomes in terms of prices, coverage and penetration. After introducing facilities-based 
competition below, I will further discuss the welfare effects. 
In the case of regulation according to maximum penetration (total welfare), we obtain the 
regulated price p
RP (p
RW), the smallest covered region s
RP (s




RP = 17.6, s
RP = 345.3, Y
RP = 36,300,000, and 
p
RW = 21.2, s
RW = 299.6, Y
RW = 35,900,000, respectively.  
The results imply that regulation according to maximum penetration increases penetration 
from 48% in the unregulated case to 72.6%, whereas coverage decreases from 96% to 88.1%. 
Welfare maximization leads to only a slightly slower penetration compared to the maximum 
penetration regime (71.8%), but the higher prices imply significantly higher coverage of 
91.0% of all households. Clearly, welfare maximization takes into account that slight increase 
in prices hardly hurts consumers in covered areas but leads to huge gain for consumers who 
become covered due to the price increase. 
I postpone further discussion of welfare for the basic example until I have introduced 
facilities-based competition. Before doing the latter, I discuss the optimum regulatory mark-
up on average costs and its dependence on how even the distribution of the population is. 
3.4  Side remark: The impossibility of cost oriented, geographically uniform access 
charges 
Regulation of access charges and rental rates in the EU is cost-oriented according to forward 
looking long run average incremental costs (FLR(A)IC) in most cases. Furthermore, rates are 
                                                 
8 For the 2007 data, see European Commission (2008), for the 2005 data see European 
Commission (2005). typically set in geographically uniform way.
9 In our model FLRIC implies regulation 
according to (economic) average costs. The effect of such a regulation is straightforward:  
The monopolist does not invest at all in such a regime! 
The reason is that with strictly decreasing population density independent of the smallest 
covered region s about half of the regions (markets) do not break even. Choosing a larger 
value of s would decrease costs and also average costs due to higher population density and 
would therefore further decrease regulated rates. With strictly increasing population density 
across regions, geographically uniform FLRIC inevitably leads to a zero investment level.  
The general result is rather obvious and probably not much disputed. It is probably more 
interesting to look at the magnitudes of divergence between costs and regulated rates for the 
above examples. The results show that optimal regulation leads to rather high mark-ups on 
average costs. In the case of regulation according to total welfare, the realized average costs 
AC
RW are 9.8. Given that p
RW = 21.2, this gives mark-up of more than 100% and significant 
pure profits. Even with regulation according to maximum penetration the mark-up is almost 
100% since AC
RP = 9.0. These results show that the necessity to encourage investment by the 
incumbent requires rather high profits for the incumbent, if rates are supposed to be 
geographically uniform. The alternative, of course, would be to allow for geographically 
differentiated rates meaning that rates should be higher in the high-cost rural areas. Before I 
compare the effects of geographically uniform vs. geographically differentiated prices in the 
framework of facilities-based competition, I explore the effect of the population distribution, 
i.e. of the slope of the population density function on the optimal (regulatory) mark-up.  
3.5  Population distribution and the optimal mark-up 
In order to determine the effect of changes in the unevenness in population distributions, I 
change the basic model by changing the slope of the population density in Figure 1 and 
keeping total population constant at the same time. Again, I rank the regional markets n 
according to size with nn   being the largest region and n = 0 denoting the smallest region. 
The relation between the regions and their respective population density is now  
skl n   , 
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9 For a recent discussion on the level of the EU of how to set rates when population 
densities differ see the ERG draft Common Position on Geographic Aspects of Market 
Analysis (definition and remedies), June 2008 
 (http://www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg08_20rev1_cp_geogr_aspects_080707.pdf)  where   1 kl n  2 . The value of k is chosen so that total population is unaffected by 
changes in population distribution. Figure 4 describes the resulting distributions where the 
slope l varies from 0, i.e. an equal distribution of the population across regional markets, to 1, 
the original case. 
 







Population density s 
l = 0 
l = 1 
Figure 4: Different population distributions with l ranging between 0 and 1 
Regions n  
(increasing order of 
population density)  
In the following discussion I employ the values of the above simulation and focus on 
regulation according to total welfare. The results are comparable for other welfare measures 
such as regulation according to maximum penetration or according to a consumer standard. 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the effect of changes in the unevenness of the population 
distribution on the welfare-optimal markup of prices over average costs and on the regulated 
prices, respectively. Note that both figure exhibit a kink at l = .46. For smaller values of l, 
population density in the smallest markets is sufficiently large to warrant 100% coverage. To 
the right of the kink, not all regions have broadband access and the threshold n of the smallest 
region covered increases with l.  
A result which derives directly from Figure 5 is that a more even population distribution (i.e. 
a lower l) leads to a lower mark up. In the limit of an even distribution of the population 
across regional markets, price is equal to average costs. Note that the markup decreases only 
slowly with a decrease in l as long as not the whole population is covered (at the kink at l = 
.46). Therefore, rather high markups are used to provide incentives to invest even if the slope 
of the population densities is rather modest.  
13 
 Figure 6 depicts the effect of a more evenly distributed population on the welfare-optimal 
price. Surprisingly, Figure 6 exhibits non-monotonicity. Starting from the original case (l = 1) 
and reducing the dissimilarity of regions by reducing l leads to an increase in prices until the 
kink is reached, i.e. until coverage is 100%. Therefore, we obtain the interesting and not 
obvious result that, given total population, a more even distribution of the population across 
regions should be associated with higher regulated prices as long as coverage is below 100%. 
For values to the left of the kink, the expected result applies: a further reduction of l leads to a 
(steep) price decrease. While the latter effect is straightforward, the former deserves an 
explanation. We know from Figure 5 that the mark-up continuously decreases as we decrease 
l. Therefore, the fact that the graph in Figure 6 is negatively inclined to the right of the kink 
implies that prices decrease even though the mark-up increases. The economic reason is that a 
more even distribution across regions leads an increase in average costs for the respective 
parameter values.  
 
 











Figure 5: Ratio of optimal regulated price to average costs as a function of the unevenness of 
the population distribution 
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Figure 6: Optimal regulated price as a function of the unevenness of the population 
distribution 
The explanation is two-fold: First, distributing the population more evenly across regions 
without changing total population (i.e. decreasing l) implies that the number of users living in 
already covered regions decreases. Therefore, higher investment is needed to cover the same 
population; average costs are higher as a consequence. Second, lower values of l (but still 
greater than .46) imply that a given increase in price triggers higher investments. Due to the 
smaller slope of the population density schedule (Figure 4), more previously uncovered 
regions become profitable for a given price increase. Therefore, a bigger expansion of 
coverage both in terms of the regions and in terms of the households covered results. The 
marginal incentive for the regulator to increase the price increases. This is the reason why 
markups decrease slowly with a more evenly distributed population, i.e. with a decreasing l. 
In terms of Figure 5, it explains why the curve is rather flat in the right part.  
Before going back to the original model (l = 1) and examining the case of infrastructure-based 
competition, I want to stress an important policy conclusion of the non-monotonicity result: 
Simple (price) comparisons across countries do not appear to be very helpful when trying to 
determine the optimal rates and to evaluate regulation. Simple benchmarking rules such as the 
‘best current practice’ rule used in the EU for a long time to determine interconnection rates in the 
member states
10 can be detrimental to investment incentives. Such a policy goes even wrong in 
                                                 
15 
 
10 See, e.g., the Commission Recommendation of 29 July 1998 amending 
Recommendation 98/195/EC on interconnection in a liberalised telecommunications market 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31998H0511:EN:NOT  the case where a given population is just differently distributed across a given number of regions 
ceteris paribus. 
4.  Facilities-based competition 
Now I allow for facilities-based competition. An entrant C, think of a cable company, can 
enter the regional markets by making also the fixed investments f per regional market. The 
structure of the game is as follows: The incumbent I and the entrant C play a two-stage game. 
In stage 1, they simultaneously decide on their coverage, i.e., they choose the smallest 
regional market they cover s and s
C, respectively, and invest. In stage 2, the two firms set 
prices, that is, they compete a la Bertrand. As Valletti et al. (2002) I assume that the firms 
serve all regional markets greater than their optimally chosen smallest market. Furthermore, I 
choose always the equilibrium with the incumbent having higher coverage in equilibrium if 
two asymmetric equilibria exist which differ with respect to the coverage of the firms.  
Figure 7 depicts the potential market structure with facilities-based competition. There is a 
duopoly segment, a monopoly segment and a segment of regional markets which is not 
served. The ratio   D / (D + M) of the monopoly and duopoly areas describes the relative 
importance of the duopoly region.  
 
Figure 7: Market structure under facilities based competition 
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 With respect to consumer demand I assume that they consider broadband via cable and via 
DSL as differentiated products.






























Note that this specification can be derived from a linear-quadratic utility function and yields 
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I assume that [0,1] with the boundary values implying independent products and perfect 
substitutes, respectively. Note that this specification exhibits love of variety in the sense that 
aggregate demand and utility increases as products get more differentiated (i.e. as  
decreases). With our interpretation of demand as being unit demand for broadband access by 
heterogeneous consumers, taken literally the specification implies that some customers might 
demand both cable and DSL access to the internet. The product differentiation parameter  is 
the key parameter both with respect to the intensity of competition and the welfare effects.  
4.1  Unregulated duopoly 
If there is no regulation at all, the results are straightforward. Solving the game backwards, we 
obtain the price p













Clearly, the monopolist price discriminates between the monopoly and the duopoly area and 
charges the monopoly price in the former. As a consequence, the incumbents coverage is the 
same as in the unregulated monopoly and is determined by s
M. The coverage choice of the 
cable entrant determines from the reduced profit function, where the equilibrium prices are 
already used.  
   ()
C
s CD
C s p cy s f d s      
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11 Distaso et al. (2006) and Valletti et al. (2002) employ the same assumption and the 
same demand specification. Differentiating the reduced profit function with respect to s
C reveals the simple decision rule 
of the cable firm: Markets are covered as long as profits are at least as high as the investment 
cost. In formal terms, we obtain: 















The parameters have a straightforward effect on coverage of the cable firm. Higher 
investment costs lead to lower coverage, exogenously more differentiated products (lower ) 
allow higher markups, increase profitability and therefore also coverage (s
C decreases). If 
competition is too tough and  is close to one, the cable firm does not enter the market. In the 
next section I will compare these results with a situation where the regulator imposes a 
uniform pricing constraint on the incumbent. 
4.2  Duopoly under a uniform pricing constraint
12 
If the regulator (or marketing reasons) imposes a uniform pricing constraint on the incumbent, 
a pure strategy equilibrium in prices does not exist for large values of the product 
differentiation parameter . If products are close substitutes, the incumbent’s price would 
have to be rather low in order to gain market share against the cable entrant. As a 
consequence the incumbent might choose to serve only his captive area under tough price 
competition. This cannot be a Nash-equilibrium, however, since the cable firm would charge 
a high price in response, triggering again undercutting by the incumbent. In a related paper I 
describe in detail how the mixed strategy pricing equilibrium looks like.
13 Here, I briefly 
mention its characteristics and evaluate the implications for coverage and welfare.  
Taking into account the coverage decision, a pure-strategy equilibrium in prices exists for  < 
.7958. For values of  in the interval [.7958, .94], a mixed strategy equilibrium exists, in 
which the cable firm charges a deterministic price and the incumbent randomizes between the 
monopoly price and the price, which is the best response to the cable firm’s price. Note that 
this equilibrium has a nice interpretation in the tradition of papers such as Varian (1980): The 
probability with which the incumbent chooses the low price can be interpreted as the 
probability with which the incumbent serves all markets in a given period. Apart from the 
                                                 
12 The details of the simulation used in this and the following sections are available as  
a Mathematica-file form the author on request. Here I restrict myself to the presentation and 
interpretation of the results. 
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13 Götz (2009) interpretation the parameter region, in which the mixed strategy equilibrium applies appears 
to be rather relevant. The different access technologies to the internet might not be too 
differentiated from the viewpoint of the consumers. 
Figure 8 compares the coverage decisions under various regulatory regimes. Apart from the 
uniform pricing constraint it considers the unregulated benchmark and symmetric price-
regulation according to the welfare maximization scenario with only a telecoms incumbent. I 
turn to the latter case in the next section. 
As is well known from the results Valletti et al. (2002) derive for the region of pure strategy 
equilibria, coverage of both the telecom incumbent and the cable firm is lower under a 





14 The result for the 
incumbent is straightforward as the uniform price is lower than the unconstrained monopoly 
price. The result concerning the entrant is somewhat surprising since the uniform pricing 
constraint leads to higher prices in the duopoly area compared to the unregulated benchmark. 
As Valletti et al. mention, the reason is a strategic effect: The entrant can induce soft behavior 


























Figure 8: Coverage of incumbent and cable firm and under various regulatory regimes 
                                                 
14 Note that Valletti et al. (2002) claim the result for the entrant only in the case of a 

















Figure 9: Welfare W under facilities-based competition (various regulatory regimes) 
Figure 8 shows that looking only at pure-strategy equilibria might miss an important point. If 
consumers regard the two products as close substitute, competition is fierce in an unregulated 
duopoly. As a consequence the entrant invests only in very large regions or not at all. In such 
a situation, a uniform pricing constraint might serve as a regulatory safeguard to secure 
competitive entry. For rather high values of  (greater than about .85) coverage of the cable 
firm is higher (and even increasing in ) under the uniform pricing constraint. In Figure 9, I 
examine the welfare consequences of the different scenarios.  
If one compares welfare under facilities-based competition in the unregulated case 
(W
unregulated) with welfare under a uniform pricing constraint (W
UP) the first thing to note is 
that the two regimes hardly make a difference in terms of welfare unless goods are close 
substitutes. While coverage differs significantly in the range where pure-strategy equilibria 
exist, this hardly affects aggregate welfare even though it affects distribution in the sense that 
a uniform pricing constraint benefits people living in the covered monopoly regions.  
Figure 9 also shows that welfare decreases fast in the unregulated situation if the products 
become ever closer substitutes. Together with the result that welfare hardly differs between 
the unregulated regime and the regime with a uniform pricing constraint in the range where 
pure-strategy equilibria exist, Figure 9 demonstrates the potential of the uniform pricing 
constraint to act as a regulatory safeguard. Of course, such a safeguard is important if 
consumers might consider the products as close substitutes. In the next section I discuss how 21 
 
                                                
heavy-handed regulation such as a price-cap or access regulation compares to the two 
scenarios discussed above. 
4.3  Infrastructure-based competition with price-cap and access regulation 
This section assumes that both the entrant and the incumbent face the same price cap and 
must provide access at the same conditions, respectively. Furthermore, I assume that the 
regulator sets the welfare maximizing price from the regime with the regulated monopoly. 
The first assumption mainly serves to guarantee that in equilibrium the entrant does not 
charge a higher price than the incumbent.
15 Recent regulatory experience e.g. in the 
Netherlands concerning regulation of cable networks indicates that regulation might well be 
symmetric.  
The second assumption allows easy comparison with the previous cases. Furthermore, it 
provides a reference case, which appears to match regulator’s preoccupation with traditional 
incumbents. Figures 8 and 9 (relevant are the curves with superscript SymReg) include as a 
further assumption that the firms are not allowed to set prices below the regulated price. The 
constraint that firms would like to set prices below p
RW, the price set by the regulator becomes 
binding for large values of the product differentiation parameter . Recent margin-squeeze 
cases indicate that regulators and antitrust authorities actually prevent network providers from 
reducing prices.
16 If one does not consider this constraint as relevant, the results from the 
cases without price regulation apply in the relevant range. If there were no further restriction, 




Note that Figure 9 includes welfare in the case of a regulated monopoly. This case provides an 
interesting reference for two reasons: First, in some countries, e.g. in Germany and in 
Portugal, the telecoms incumbent owned and owns, resp., the cable network. These 
incumbents only invested in one broadband technology, not two. Therefore, comparison 
shows what is lost (or gained) in terms of welfare, if incumbents are not horizontally 
 
15 See Briglauer et al. (2008) for a discussion of the ‘problem’ that entrants might 
charge higher prices than the incumbent. They also provide a demand specification which 
leads to the same results as in our case. 
16 See Briglauer et al. (2008) for a discussion of this issue. 22 
 
                                                
unbundled. Second, it might be an explicit policy goal to prevent duplication of infrastructure 
for the traditional reasons of either subadditivity or of sustainability of cross-subsidization.
17   
Figure 9 demonstrates that the degree of product differentiation is a key variable with respect 
to the welfare effects of the different regimes. If products are almost identical (i.e.,  is close 
to one), an entry ban and horizontal bundling of the networks, respectively, may lead to 
higher welfare if the monopolistic incumbent faces an omniscient and benevolent regulator. 
Probably most interesting is that a significant range of  values exists ( around .75), for 
which even perfect and costless (price) regulation aimed at the telecoms incumbent cannot 
significantly improve welfare. If the networks are more differentiated a ‘single network 
policy’ is clearly inferior to unregulated competition, even if regulation is perfect.  
Taking into account the inevitable costs associated with regulation and the imperfect 
information regulators face, Figure 9 hardly supports heavy-handed (price and entry) 
regulation. The existence of a significant range where welfare under (costless and omniscient) 
heavy-handed regulation and welfare in an unregulated situation and light-handed regulation 
situation, respectively, hardly differs, lends support to less interventionist policies like that in 
the US with respect to next generation networks.  
5.  Public policy: Subsidization of broadband investment and access  
In this final policy section, I analyze the effects of both demand-side and supply-side 
subsidies on total welfare.
18 Both policy instruments are and were employed, respectively. In 
Austria, for instance, spending on broadband access was tax-deductible by final consumers. 
Supply-side subsidies to broadband are discussed in many countries, in particular under the 
headline of universal service obligations.
19 While some general results are available, I focus 
again on the results of the simulation to illustrate both magnitudes and global rather than local 
effects. An important local effect is that a ‘small’ subsidy starting from the decentralized 
equilibrium is always welfare improving. The reason is the consumer surplus effect: Firms 
 
17 See Höffler for arguments in favour of entry bans. The projects to subsidize Next 
Generation Network projects in Singapore and Australia appear to focus very much on a 
single infrastructure. See WIK (2008). 
18 Valletti et al. discuss coverage constraints, which are alternative policy instruments 
to increase coverage. However, they do not consider the respective policy effects in their 
discussion of universal service obligations. Coverage constraints without additional subsidies 
do not appear to be a relevant policy instrument with respect to next generation networks, for 
instance.  
19 See the Economist magazine supra note 2 for a policy discussion, and Picot & 
Wernick (2007) for an overview of activities in various countries. cannot extract all consumer surplus created by upgrading an exchange. Therefore, the 
incentive to invest is downward biased and under-investment results. 
In order to analyze the effects of the subsidies I extend the above simulation to allow for both 
a subsidization of the fixed investment costs (Figure 10) and for a price subsidy received by 
the households (Figure 11), respectively. In addition to the above assumptions on parameters, 
I assume that  = .65, a value also employed by Valletti et al. Furthermore, I abstract from 
cost of funds due to distortionary taxation and keep on assuming equal weights of both 
consumers and firms in the social welfare function. I present here the results for the case 
where a uniform pricing constraint is in place, a case which seems to be relevant for most 
countries. 
 
Figure 10: Welfare W with supply-side broadband subsidies  
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Figure 11: Welfare W with demand-side broadband subsidies  
Figure 10 allows for three conclusions beyond the general result that ‘small subsidies are 
welfare increasing. First, given that the subsidy is not too high in the sense that it does not 
capture the whole investment costs, subsidization of both firms is much more welfare 
increasing than only subsidizing ‘rural’ regions by paying subsidies to the incumbent. The 
reason is a competition effect of the subsidies. The subsidies to the entrant increase her 
coverage. Apart from the increase in availability this increases the duopoly region leading 
also to lower prices. This effect explains the difference in the welfare effects.  
Second, the optimal subsidies are of significant size. They account for close to 50% of the 
investment costs. As a consequence of such subsidies the minimum size of regions covered 
would decrease by 50% from a population of 20,000 (s = 200) to about 10,000 (s = 100). 
Third, and going back to the policy where only the incumbent receives subsidies, Figure 10 
shows that subsidies that pay for almost the total investment cost leading to an almost 100% 
coverage yield welfare levels similar to the situation without subsidies. This holds without 
accounting for potential network externalities. This result indicates that, at least as long as the 
social cost of funds is not too high, supply-side subsidies for reasons of regional policy should 
not do much harm to total welfare.  
Turning to demand-side subsidies and Figure 11, one caveat is in order. Under imperfect 
competition with prices above marginal cost, (small) subsidies are always welfare increasing. 




                                                
and consumer surplus receive equal weights in the social welfare function and the fact that 
subsidies are financed by revenues from non-distortionary taxation lead to the high welfare 
gains apparent in Figure 11. Accordingly, the underlying amount of subsidies would be huge. 
At the welfare maximum (subsidy/household ~36€), the price would be equal to the subsidy; 
consumers in covered regions would receive the service for free, i.e. at marginal costs.  
Note that demand-side subsidies mainly benefit consumers in more densely populated 
regions, which would be covered anyway. While a subsidy of about 36€ would enable all 
consumers in covered regions to access broadband, however small their willingness to pay is, 
the smallest covered region would exhibit an s of about 125, a value significantly higher than 
with supply-side subsidies.  
Taken together, supply-side subsidies can be seen as an effective instrument to increase 
coverage and to supply smaller regions with access. Demand-side subsidies appear to be an 
expensive instrument to predominantly increase penetration.
20 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper examined the effect of various regulatory regimes on firms’ incentives to provide 
broadband access to the internet. Taking into account differences in the population density 
across the regions in an economy, the focus was on the trade-off between broadband 
penetration and broadband coverage. A rather stylized model revealed general patterns, which 
also yield insights for the evaluation of regulatory options with respect to new technologies 
such as Next Generation Networks. The analysis emphasized the Schumpeterian argument of 
market power as a prerequisite for investment. As far as regulation is concerned, the paper 
showed that even costless and well-informed heavy-handed regulation need not be able to 
improve much upon the unregulated benchmark in terms of welfare. Light-handed regulation 
such as uniform pricing constraints might be preferable as a regulatory safeguard in a world 
where regulators lack knowledge of key parameters. Of particular importance for the 
evaluation of the different regulatory options is the question how differentiated products are 
from the viewpoint of consumers. It is an important task for empirical research to find out 
more about consumer’s valuation of product variety in this specific case. However, even 
robust empirical results indicating a potential positive effect of heavy-handed regulation in the 
model would only constitute the best-case-scenario for regulatory intervention. Given the 
 
20 These conclusions are in line with the findings of Goolsbee (2003), who also finds 
that supply-side subsidies are superior to usage subsidies.  26 
 
uncertainty surrounding investments in new technologies, in particular with respect to the 
demand side, regulatory commitment to either no or only light-handed regulation appears to 
be superior.
21  
The model makes a clearer case for policy action when it comes to supply-side subsidies. 
With this kind of potential state intervention rent-seeking by firms might lead to strategic 
withholding of investments in otherwise profitable regions by incumbents. It is a topic for 
future research, how subsidization schemes should look like if one takes strategic incentives 
of firms with respect to policy into account. 
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